This paper discusses recent developments in Scottish nationalist constitutional thought during the period of 2002 to 2014, showing how the Scottish constitutional conversation has diverged from, but continues to be influenced by, the UK-wide constitutional conversation at Westminster. It presents Scottish nationalist constitutional thought as a 'very British radicalism', which is characterised by certain constitutional forms and ideas that are radical in a British context (such as popular sovereignty, proportional representation, a written constitution, and a commitment to covenantal socio-economic and environmental provisions) while at the same time retaining a persistent 'Britishness' in terms of specific institutional proposals and ambivalence towards the principles of constitutional government. Finally, I will discuss possible designs of a future constitutional settlement in Scotland and the United Kingdom. Notably, I will explore how far the Scottish constitutional tradition might impact on the constitutional shape of the United Kingdom.
balanced relationship between the executive and legislative branches.
The Scottish Constitutional Convention was not alone in its critique of British orthodoxies and institutions. UK-wide reform groups, such as Charter 88, pointed to a wider sense of dissatisfaction. However, a major difference between the Scottish and the British-English constitutional traditions is this: that whereas voices for reform have remained firmly on the margins of English politics, in Scotland their grievances have been heard, accepted, and used to shape institutional change. The Scotland Act 1998 gives institutional form to nearly all of the Constitutional Convention's desires: the Scottish Parliament is elected by proportional representation for fixed terms, and the executive has no right of arbitrary dissolution. The Scotland Act formed, in relation to the Scottish Parliament, a 'quasi-constitution', which was beyond the powers of the Parliament to change unilaterally. European Convention rights were embedded in the Scotland Act, and a system of judicial review was established by which the 'constitutionality' of laws could be tested. The Consultative Steering Group, created to prepare the Parliament's working practices, made further procedural recommendations, which were broadly accepted, to enhance the role of the opposition and of committees, and to strengthen Parliament as a whole (Bulmer 2014a; Cairney and Johnston 2013) .
Since devolution, the practical limitations of these changes, faced with an adversarial party system and a deeply engrained legacy of majoritarian politics, have become apparent (Cairney and Johnston, 2013) . Nevertheless, important, and in their own way 'radical', institutional changes have been made. While the UK as a whole voted against even moderate electoral reform in 2010, proportional representation in Scotland is no longer the demand of a handful of reformers; it is a fact. Restrictions have been placed on the prerogative of the Crown, reducing the potential for political influence by the monarch in government formation or the dissolution of Parliament. Constitutional ideas and institutions that were once 'somewhat radical' (MacCormick, 1991; 2000) have now become 'part of the common stock of democratic thought in Scotland today' (MacCormick, 2008) .
The divergence between constitutional traditions has deep roots. Since the 1950s some 
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Scottish constitutional law. As early as 1964, the first known draft Constitution for an independent Scotland was published by a group calling itself the Scottish Provisional Constituent Assembly (SCPA) (Moffat,1993) . This included a range of what were then, in a British context, constitutional novelties: a written Constitution, limits on the crown prerogatives, justiciable rights, proportional representation, a unicameral Parliament, constitutional amendment by referendum, a powerful ombudsman (Bulmer 2011a) . Four years later, the catalogue of constitutional grievances set out by H. J. Paton in The Claim of Scotland (1968) pointed to a distinctly Scottish constitutional tradition, which, if dormant, retained a shadow of life that might one-day be revived. The SNP worked on developing a draft during the 1970s, with its 1977 text (which again provided for popular sovereignty through a written Constitution that only the people, and not Parliament, could amend) forming the basis for subsequent proposals. In those days, however, Scottish autonomists were at best a marginal force in politics, and these views were ignored by the Anglo-centric mainstream of constitutional scholarship.
The SNP's most recent draft of a permanent Constitution for an independent Scotland was published in 2002 (SNP 2002; Bulmer, 2011a) . This 2002 draft has been analysed elsewhere (Bulmer, 2011a; 2011b) , and it is necessary here only to provide an overview of its main provisions. It opens with a ringing proclamation of popular sovereignty and constitutional supremacy (SNP, 2002 E -38 a two-thirds majority of Parliament (SNP 2002: Article V) . In the absence of a second chamber, the draft Constitution contained a minority veto referendum provision which would enable bills, other than money bills, to be suspended for up to eighteen months by a two-fifths minority of the members of Parliament; the majority would be able to overturn this suspension by appealing to the people in a referendum (Bulmer 2011c (defined by Hayden [1992: 655) ] as 'a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the members of one ethnically defined nation over residents in a particular state'). It specified no national flag or anthem, contained no preamble, had an open approach to citizenship based on residence not ethnicity, and made no mention of church-state relations (Bulmer 2011a ). European Convention rights were integrated into the text, including certain protocols such as the abolition of the death penalty. The draft also provided for socioeconomic rights, including a right to fair working conditions, housing, education and healthcare.
In many contexts, such proposals would be unremarkable. Written constitutions, guided by principles of higher-law constitutionalism, are the common stuff of which modern democracies are made (Goldsworthy 2006; Law and Versteeg 2012; Miller 2010; Tate and Vallinder 1995; Thornhill 2011) . In a British context, however, these constitutional proposals, and the principles that undergird them, are radical. While the constitutional orthodoxies of parliamentary sovereignty and conventional practice prevail at Westminster, many within Scotland have learnt a new language of democratic constitutionalism with popular (rather than parliamentary) sovereignty at its core.
A 'Very British' Radicalism: Developments 2002-2014
During its minority administration (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) ) SNP made few constitutional commitments. Although the party's constitutional policy was never formally changed, the Government's primary focus was on domestic administration. After gaining a majority in 2011, however, important constitutional principles were re-affirmed. In early 2012 the Scottish Government asked the Scottish Parliament to endorse a key clause of the Claim of Right containing the principle of popular sovereignty. This endorsement was granted overwhelmingly, with Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green and independent members, as well as the SNP, all voting in favour; only the Conservatives abstained. By this decision, a principle which had once been a moral claim, external to accepted constitutional principles, was recognized and embraced by Scotland's national legislature.
This was followed, in November 2013 by a White Paper, 'Scotland's Future', that reaffirmed key aspects of Scottish constitutionalism. It promised that proportional representation, popular sovereignty, and judicially guaranteed human rights, would be entrenched in Scotland's new constitutional order:
Independence will enable Scotland to be a modern, democratic European country with independent government institutions that build on the existing Scottish Parliament, Scottish Government, autonomous legal system and independent judiciary. […] Central to this will be a written constitution setting out and protecting the rights of the people of Scotland. (Scottish Government 2013: 351) The Scottish Government also committed itself in the White Paper to a two-stage constitution-building process. Firstly, the Scottish Parliament would create an interim 'Constitutional Platform', establishing the ground-rules and institutional frameworks of a Scottish state from the date of independence. There would then be an inclusive process, during the first post-independence Parliament, to develop an enduring Scottish Constitution:
One of the first and most fundamental tasks of the parliament of an independent Scotland will be to establish the process for preparing Scotland's first written constitution through an open, participative and inclusive constitutional convention. (Scottish Government, 2013: 351). This two-stage process marked a change from the SNP's previous policy. When the SNP was in opposition (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) , it had envisaged a process similar to that which took place in most former British colonies, whereby a prospective constitution would be agreed and put to the people before the referendum (SNP, 2002; 2005) . This tactical change in the chronological order of independence and constitution-making reflected, according to Scottish Government sources, a desire to avoid the politically damaging perception that the Scottish Government would dictate the terms of the future constitution. Yet, in opting for this two-stage process, the Scottish Government distanced itself from the specifics of the SNP's 2002 text (as the details of the future Constitution were now to be worked out after independence, not presented to the people before the vote).
Delaying detailed constitution-drafting until after independence gave the Scottish Government the ability both to promise more, in terms of constitutional rhetoric, and to deliver less, in terms of clear constitutional guarantees, than has been previously envisaged.
The 2002 draft reflected a liberal-procedural (Lerner, 2011) approach to constitutionalism.
While being strong on human rights, democratic processes, and protections for political minorities, it contained no rhetorical preamble, articulated no grand vision of society, and was silent on matters of national identity, religion and values. Since 2011, however, the SNP's proposals -and public rhetoric -have focused on the prescriptive potential of a Constitution, with less emphasis on procedures and institutional rules, and more emphasis on the constitutional entrenchment of certain principles and policy decisions that are deemed to be foundational to the new Scotland.
The White Paper indicated that a post-independence Constitution could, for example, contain prescriptive provisions on such matters as 'equality of opportunity and entitlement to live free of discrimination and prejudice'; 'entitlement to public services and to a standard of living that, as a minimum, secures dignity and self-respect and provides the opportunity for people to realise their full potential both as individuals and as members of wider society'; 'protection of the environment and the sustainable use of Scotland's natural resources to embed Scotland's commitment to sustainable development and tackling climate change'; 'a ban on nuclear weapons being based in Scotland'; 'controls on the use of military force'; 'rights in relation to healthcare, welfare and pensions'; 'children's rights' and 'rights concerning other social and economic matters, such as the right to education Despite this professed constitutional radicalism, the draft interim Constitution was a short and rather minimal document. It would have retained the existing institutional structures of the devolved Parliament and Government, adapting them minimally to the needs of an independent state. As such, it contained almost no institutional provisions.
There was nothing in the text to regulate how the Parliament of Scotland would elected, its terms of office, the process of government formation, relations between ministers and the Crown, the mechanism for appointing and removing judges, the procedure for enacting laws, the holding of referendums, or any of the other key procedural institutional elements of that it is the primary task of any written constitution to define. All these matters would have been regulated by an amended Scotland Act as a separate, sub-constitutional, statute.
Moreover, although popular sovereignty was proudly proclaimed, the text of the draft interim Constitution made no provision for the effective entrenchment of the Constitution.
The power to amend the Constitution, and the Scotland Act, was to reside in the ordinary parliamentary majority. It contained no clear constitutional supremacy clause and, indeed, the right of the courts to review the constitutionality of laws (which, in any case, would be rendered quite meaningless by the absence of entrenchment) was not explicitly stated. This would, in practice, have transferred sovereignty -understood simply as the power to make goals (the stake all political actors have in a functioning, legitimate, state) and 'distributive' goals (the stake each actor has in maintaining and expanding its own power). The stronger a party is, and the surer it is of maintaining its electoral strength, the more that party will, on the one hand, seek to maximize the power of incumbents (expecting to enjoy incumbency) and, on the other hand, seek to place substantive and policy provisions in the constitution that are favourable to its own ends. 
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procedure, which featured so prominently in the SNP's 2002 text, has never been publicly mentioned since the party came to power, and finds no place in the White Paper's proposals or in the 2014 draft interim Constitution. This is exactly what one would expect from a party that anticipates being in government rather than opposition. Conversely, the Scottish Government's constitutional announcements on substantive issues, such as the public funding of university education and a ban on weapons of mass destruction, show signs of wanting to use the constitution to promote the party's policy goals.
The change of emphasis can also be attributed, at least in part, to a clash between the popular constitutional consciousness unleashed by the independence campaign, on the one hand, and the ingrained habits of the British state, on the other. Public demands for a written constitution were voiced by a diverse range of civil society groups on the Yes side of the referendum debate, but the civil service in Scotland, which is steeped in British ways of working, and seemingly hostile or apathetic to the idea of higher-law constitutionalism, struggled to conceive of a constitution in any terms but those described by Eskridge and This is not to deny the emergence of a distinctly Scottish constitutionalism (the idea that a Constitution could, in the name of a sovereign people, commit the state to principles such as free university tuition or the prohibition of nuclear weapons would be quite alien to orthodox British constitutional thought); it is merely to note that Scottish constitutionalism does not exist in a vacuum, but in a tussle of party-politics and long term influences. 
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Moreover, the change in the SNP's constitutional priorities does not negate the existence of a Scottish constitutional tradition that is wider than the SNP. It is worth reiterating that the Claim of Right was asserted as a national claim, not merely a nationalist one. Its principles were endorsed by a wide spectrum of the political class and by civic society -from Gordon Brown downwards.
I These principles were not invented by the Convention, but were derived from a long tradition of distinctly Scottish constitutionalism with roots that can be traced back through the theo-political thought of the Scottish
Reformation to the limited and contractual kingship of the Declaration of Arbroath (Bulmer 2014a) . Indeed, it could be argued that the 2014 draft interim constitution was itself 'unconstitutional', in that its substitution of parliamentary for popular sovereignty contravened the grundnorm of Scotland -which is the sovereignty of 'the whole community of the realm', in their original, plenary, constituent capacity -and the consequent limitation of any parliamentary body.
Consequences for Scotland and the UK: From 2014 Onwards
The rejection, for the time being, of independence, does not mean that we can simply go back to the old ways of thinking about the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament.
The referendum can be interpreted as an endorsement and a confirmation, not a denial, of the principle that the people of Scotland are sovereign and so can determine the form of government best suited to their needs. Such sovereign and constituent power does not demand the end of the United Kingdom; merely that, if the United Kingdom is to hold together, it must be based on a new constitutional settlement in which Scotland's placeand the rightful place of the people within Scotland -is properly recognized.
The referendum showed that a majority of the people in Scotland wish to maintain the 
E -45
Former SNP Leader, Alex Salmond, who is contesting the 2015 general election, has stated that his party's priority is to ensure fulfillment of that vow by delivering home rule, interpreted as autonomy over everything except foreign affairs and defence (Knight 2015).
In Scotland, 'We the people' have chosen to be governed as part of a United Kingdom, sharing powers with United Kingdom-wide institutions as required -but only on such terms as the people agree to, and only for so long as the people wish. 
A Federal United Kingdom
The defining characteristic of a federation is that there are 'two constitutionally established orders of government with some genuine autonomy from each other' 
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criminal law -that would be unacceptable in a Scottish context, if the aim is to produce a compromise that would make the Union attractive to 'Yes' voters.
If a workable and enduring federal solution is to be found for the United Kingdom, it would have to be a very loose federation -or perhaps, more precisely, a 'confederation', III in which limited powers over certain matters are shared between Scotland and the other nations of the United Kingdom on an equal, mutual, consensual basis, such that: (i) sovereignty resides ultimately with the peoples of the states, who retain a right of secession;
IV (ii) the powers of the Union are more limited than is usual in most contemporary federations, being restricted to foreign affairs, defence, the monarchy, passports, immigration, the currency, and perhaps -for a transitional period -a few uncontroversial incidentals; (iii) the states contribute to the common treasury from their own funds, rather than being taxed directly; and (iv) the central institutions of the federation are kept relatively small and simple. 
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autonomy and those wish to put the brakes on the process, is so wide that anything acceptable to an SNP-led Scottish Government is unlikely to be acceptable to opposition parties in Scotland, and even less likely to be acceptable to Westminster.
Much of the difficulty arises from the fact that the English people (whose consent would be essential to the successful creation and operation of a federal system) have no collective say in their own national affairs. Their interests are swallowed up in a United Kingdom from which they cannot clearly distinguish or easily disentangle themselves. At present there is no English Parliament, only a United Kingdom Parliament in which English members have an overwhelming majority. Fundamental restructuring of this type is politically difficult precisely because a federation, in creating a balance of power between the Parliaments and Governments of England, on one side, and of the United Kingdom, on the other, would split the England-UK axis and thereby weaken the power-base of the British elite. Attractive as genuine federalism would be to the people of the four nations, the British establishment would abhor it, and would no doubt resist it with every power they can muster.
Besides, British legal conservatism is probably still too strong to allow the United Kingdom's conventional system to be replaced by a modern, written, federal constitution of this type. It is easier, from an establishment point of view, to find bespoke solutions for Scotland than to challenge the core workings of the British State in ways that could undermine their precious privileges. Indeed, it is arguably less painful for the British establishment to lose control over Scotland, because of independence, than to lose control over England because of a democratic federal constitution.
Secure Autonomy (Home Rule)
A second line of approach is to pursue autonomy for Scotland by means of a bilateral 'Home Rule' (federacy) settlement between Scotland and the United Kingdom Government. The terms of this settlement would be broadly as follows: the United Kingdom would continue, from the outside, to be one state, with one army, one foreign policy, one head of state, one flag, one passport and the other trappings of statehood.
However, this would just be a 'shell'. From the inside, Scotland would be a distinct entity, with its own Constitution, full internal self-government, and full fiscal autonomy - parts of what is now Slovakia). Each of these two entities was fully autonomous over all matters of domestic law, policy and finance. Each had its own Parliament, its own responsible Government, its own constitutional arrangements, and its own civil service.
There was a personal union in the monarchy, such that the titles of Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary were combined. There were just three joint ministries: foreign affairs, war, and finance. These ministers were responsible to the Emperor-King (unlike the Austrian and Hungarian Prime Ministers, who were responsible to their respective Parliaments). Besides the three common ministries, there was a Customs Union and common external trade tariff, negotiated between the two Governments, approved by the two Parliaments, and renewed every ten years. There was also a common coinage and a joint national bank, and co-operation on common projects, such as railways and postal services -all of which was negotiated between the two entities on an ad-hoc basis and implemented through parallel legislation passed by both Parliaments (Taylor 1976).
This would be possible only if the United Kingdom Government were to recognize the existence of a Scottish entity with whom treaty negotiations could take place. Some argue that a residual, dormant statehood was preserved by the Treaty of Union, and that a future Islands have enjoyed full autonomy over almost all matters except for foreign affairs, defence and the issuing of passports, which remain the responsibility of New Zealand. All these provisions are laid down in the Constitution of the Cook Islands, which can be changed only by a two-thirds majority in the Cook Islands Parliament, followed, in the case of major amendments, by a referendum. New Zealand, like the United Kingdom, is one of the few countries that lacks a written, supreme Constitution, yet this has not prevented the establishment of a written Constitution for the Cook Islands. The Cook Islands therefore show that it is possible for Scotland to have a written, supreme Constitution of our own, even while being in a Union, for external purposes, with a country that does not have a written Constitution.
Although the technicalities of the constitutional status would be different, Scotland under a Home Rule Constitution would, in practical terms, be in a position not unlike that of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, which also enjoy substantial autonomy while still being reliant on the United Kingdom Government for the purposes of foreign affairs and defence, and while still using the pound. The key difference is that Scotland would be 'inside' the United Kingdom, while the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are 'Crown dependencies'. Nevertheless, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man show that the United Kingdom can be tolerant of substantial autonomy, so long as its military and diplomatic interests are unchallenged, and the degree of autonomy they enjoy could be extended to Scotland -under suitable constitutional arrangements -without great difficulty.
Conclusion
In a fusion of nationalist and democratic rhetoric, the Scottish national movement has articulated a radical constitutionalist critique of the British system of government that goes beyond a mere 'centre-periphery' dispute. It has sought not only to redistribute power from E -54 sovereignty would not, as a point of recognized and asserted constitutional principle, have been inherent in Parliament -it would always be exercised in the name, and on the behalf, of the people. This is a point of principle that Westminster has never formally endorsed, but which in Scotland is now the foundation-stone of an emerging and vibrant constitutional tradition.
This principle has the potential to transform the next stage of the debate, about the place of Scotland within the future constitutional arrangements of the UK. The sovereign people have spoken in the independence referendum, and, while a clear majority of them have chosen to give the Union another chance, it is a chance to deliver on the terms set by the people of Scotland -not by Westminster. This means finding a form of autonomy that recognises Scotland's sovereignty, and its equality within the Union, without necessarily demanding independent statehood. Either a loose federal UK or home rule for Scotland (the choice between them is essentially a pragmatic one, dependent upon the will of Westminster and the rest of the UK to embrace radical constitutional change at the centre) if adopted in a spirit of sincerity, would enable Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom to go forward together in a partnership of equals, sharing certain powers and responsibilities where this is in our mutual interests, while respecting the liberty, autonomy and distinct interests of each country. This would appeal to many supporters of independence, since Scotland would have the ability to pursue different models of economic and social policy, to address the problems of poverty and inequality, and to fund those policies from its own resources, while shaking off the myth of being dependent 'subsidy junkies'. It would also be attractive to moderate unionists, since, despite near total autonomy in internal affair, the Scots would still be 'British', would still fly the Union flag as well as the saltire, would still carry British passports, could still join the British armed forces, would still be represented abroad by British embassies and consulates, and would still use the British pound.
Finally, if the people are to be sovereign, there should be no change to the constitutional relationship between Scotland and the rest of the UK, or to the rules by which Scottish institutions are structured, or to the rights of Scottish people, except by the consent of the people. This makes a written, supreme Constitution, capable of being amended (at least in its essentials) only by the vote of the people in a referendum, almost a prerequisite for a stable and lasting outcome. 2011-2012, prior to the re-endorsement of the Claim of Right by the Scottish Parliament, the Constitutional Commission, of which the author was then Research Director, undertook to trace the original signatories of the Claim of Right -and we discovered that many senior Labour figures, who were implacably opposed to Scottish independence, had solemnly pledged themselves to defend the sovereign rights of the people of Scotland. II To cite just two well-known illustrative examples: any change to the distribution of powers between the Union Parliament and the States in India requires a constitutional amendment passed by a two-thirds majority in both Houses of the national Parliament and the approval of a majority of the State legislatures; in Canada, most important amendments require the approval of the legislatures of at least seven out of ten Provinces, having between them a majority of the population (the latter provision is designed to ensure that Quebec and Ontario, the two largest provinces, have a mutual veto). III The technical distinction between federalism and confederalism is a fine one that has been much debated by scholars. The Germans differentiate between a 'Bundestaat' (a federal 'union-state', with emphasis on the unity of the whole) and a 'Staatenbund' (a confederal 'union of states', with emphasis on the distinct identity of each state). This expresses the essence of the distinction more neatly than is possible in English. IV There are examples, even within these islands, of the recognition of the right of succession. The Belfast Agreement recognises the right of the people of Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and to be reunified with the rest of Ireland. The Edinburgh Agreement similarly emphasized that Scottish membership of the United Kingdom is based on consent, and can be unilaterally withdrawn. V The distinction between an 'incorporating Union' (a single, sovereign state) and a 'non-incorporating Union' (two equal entities united by treaty for certain common purposes) is drawn from Andrew Fletcher's 'State of the controversy between United and Separate Parliaments ' (Edinburgh: Saltire Society, 1982) .
